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ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
 
Debtor Bradley Orton appeals from an order by the 
United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania, which affirmed the United States Bankruptcy 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania‟s judgment. 
Construing the wildcard exemption in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5), 
those courts held that the Trustee for the Estate, not the 
Debtor, is entitled to any post-petition appreciation in value 
of the Estate‟s assets that surpasses the dollar amount 
exempted. The Bankruptcy Court and the District Court 
reasoned that Orton had exempted only an interest in an asset, 
rather than the asset itself, and thus was entitled to merely the 
dollar amount listed as exempt in Schedule C accompanying 
his bankruptcy petition and not to any future appreciation in 
value. Applying the teachings of the Supreme Court‟s 
decision in Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652 (2010), we will 
affirm. 
I. 
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The facts, insofar as they concern us here, are few. 
Orton filed an emergency voluntary petition for relief under 
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code in January 2011 and filed 
his required Schedules and statements shortly thereafter. This 
appeal concerns two of Orton‟s claimed exemptions. On 
Schedule A (real property), Orton listed his one-eighth 
interest in 34 acres of vacant land that is subject to an oil and 
gas lease. Orton stated that the fair market value of the entire 
parcel was $34,000 and claimed an exemption for $4,250, 
one-eighth of the value of the whole. On Schedule B 
(personal property), Orton listed his one-fourth interest in 
royalty interest in the oil and gas lease, to which he assigned a 
fair market value of one dollar. Orton noted on Schedule B 
that no well has been drilled on the property and that no 
royalties are currently due. On Schedule C (property claimed 
as exempt), Orton claimed wildcard exemptions for these two 
interests, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5), and claimed as 
exempt the full amount of their value from Schedules A and 
B—$4,250 and $1.  
 
No party filed objections to these exemptions within 
the 30-day period prescribed by Rule 4003(b), Federal Rules 
of Bankruptcy Procedure. The Trustee then filed a motion to 
close the case and to except Orton‟s royalty interest in the oil 
and gas lease from abandonment, thereby preserving her 
ability to recover any future royalties for the benefit of the 
Estate in the event that a well were ever drilled on the 
property. Orton agreed to close the case, but he objected to 
the Trustee‟s efforts to except the royalty interest from 
abandonment. Orton contended that because (a) the royalty 
interest was subsumed in his real property interest, (b) he had 
claimed the full, fair market value for each, and (c) no party 
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had objected to his list of exemptions, he had successfully and 
permanently removed those assets from the Estate, thereby 
securing for himself the benefits and risks of future ap- or de-
preciation, free from any creditors‟ claims. 
 
After a hearing, the Bankruptcy Court issued a 
Memorandum and Order on May 20, 2011, rejecting Orton‟s 
arguments. The Court held that the Trustee was entitled to 
pursue any future increase in value of the oil and gas lease 
above the amount explicitly stated as exempt in Schedule C.  
 
On October 14, 2011, the District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania affirmed the Order of the 
Bankruptcy Court. After examining the Supreme Court‟s 
opinion in Schwab v. Reilly, 130 S. Ct. 2652 (2010), the 
District Court adopted the Bankruptcy Court‟s reasoning in 
full. Orton timely appealed. 
 
II. 
 
The Bankruptcy Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157(b)(1). The District 
Court had jurisdiction to review the Bankruptcy Court‟s order 
pursuant to id. § 158(a)(1). We have subject matter 
jurisdiction pursuant to id. § 1291. On an appeal from a 
bankruptcy case, our review “duplicates that of the district 
court and view[s] the bankruptcy court decision unfettered by 
the district court‟s determination . . . .” In re Graves, 33 F.3d 
242, 246 (3d Cir. 1994). Accordingly, we apply a clearly 
erroneous standard to the Bankruptcy Court‟s findings of fact 
and a plenary standard to its legal conclusions. In re Handel, 
570 F.3d 140, 141 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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III. 
 
Orton contends that he is entitled to any future 
appreciation in the oil and gas lease‟s value, which may arise 
from the discovery of fossil fuels and the drilling of a well. 
But whether Orton may collect on such an increase in value 
depends on our resolution of two preliminary issues: (1) 
whether exempting a dollar amount equal to the full fair 
market value of an asset wholly exempts that asset from the 
estate; and, if not, (2) whether a debtor may nevertheless 
pursue the appreciation in value of such assets in which the 
debtor retains only an interest. We agree with the Bankruptcy 
Court and the District Court before us that Schwab counsels 
that the answer to both questions is “no.” We will, therefore, 
affirm the judgments of those courts. 
 
IV. 
 
Orton contends that, by claiming as exempt on 
Schedule C the full “value” of his interests in the oil and gas 
lease and the real estate (as estimated on Schedules A and B), 
he wholly exempted those assets. The issue of whether a 
debtor‟s listing of the fair market value of an asset fully 
exempts that asset from the estate is dealt with in 11 U.S.C. 
§ 522 and Schwab. Through dueling interpretations of both, 
the parties dispute how Schwab affects Orton‟s attempt to 
wholly exempt an asset here. We hold that the Bankruptcy 
Court and the District Court correctly construed Schwab, and 
that Orton did not fully exempt his gas and oil royalty interest 
nor his property interest. 
 
A. 
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Because of their singular importance to this case, we 
review § 522 and the Schwab reasoning briefly before turning 
to the particular contentions before us. When a debtor files for 
bankruptcy under Chapter 7, all of the debtor‟s assets become 
the property of the bankruptcy estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 541. 
Section 522 permits the debtor to reclaim certain property as 
“exempt” from the estate, subject to statutory limits and 
requirements. Generally, wholly exempted property is 
excluded from the estate “[u]nless a party in interest” objects. 
See id. § 522(l). As distinguished from portions of the Code 
that explicitly permit a debtor to exempt property as a whole, 
see, e.g., id. §§ 522(d)(9), (10)(c), § 522(d)(5)‟s wildcard 
provision—the exemption at issue here—allows the debtor to 
exempt an “aggregate interest in any property,” up to a 
certain dollar amount, id. § 522(d)(5) (emphasis added). 
 
The Supreme Court squarely addressed the impact of 
the word “interest” as it pertains to the nature of assets 
exempted under § 522(d)(5) in Schwab. The debtor in 
Schwab valued an asset at $10,718 on Schedule B and 
exempted that same dollar amount on Schedule C. The trustee 
did not object. When the trustee later discovered that the 
debtor had undervalued the asset, and that its actual value was 
$17,200—far above the statutory exemption limit—the 
trustee attempted to claim that additional value for the estate. 
The debtor contended that, no matter what the actual value of 
the asset was, she had indicated her intent to wholly exempt 
the asset from the estate by claiming as exempt on Schedule 
C the same dollar value listed on Schedule B. Because of this 
indication of intent, the debtor continued, the trustee was 
obliged to object timely if he wished to preserve any of that 
asset‟s value for the estate. 
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The Schwab Court rejected the debtor‟s arguments. 
Because “§§ 522(d)(5) and (6) define the „property claimed as 
exempt‟ as an „interest‟ in [the debtor‟s] [asset], not as the 
[asset itself] per se,” 130 S. Ct. at 2662, the Court held that 
merely listing as exempt on Schedule C the same dollar value 
of an asset that appears as its estimated value on Schedule B 
does not indicate an intent to wholly exempt that asset from 
the estate. As a result, a trustee need not object to exempted 
amounts that fall within the statutory limits to preserve the 
estate‟s rights to any value above that listed in Schedule C. 
The Court clarified that “[w]here, as here, it is important to 
the debtor to exempt the full market value of the asset or the 
asset itself, . . . the debtor [should] declare the value of her 
claimed exemption in a manner that makes the scope of the 
exemption clear.” Id. at 2668. As examples of how to 
successfully accomplish this, the Court suggested that debtors 
“list[] the exempt value as „full fair market value (FMV)‟ or 
„100% of FMV.‟” Id.  
 
B. 
 
Turning to the present case, the Bankruptcy Court and 
the District Court here both concluded that Schwab‟s 
straightforward holding doomed Orton‟s case. Other than 
claiming as exempt in Schedule C a dollar amount equal to 
the full estimated value of his assets in Schedules A and B, 
Orton did not take any actions to indicate his unambiguous 
intent to wholly exempt his assets from the Estate. The 
Bankruptcy Court therefore held that Orton had exempted 
only an interest in his assets, and not the assets themselves. 
Because the amount of this interest was within the statutory 
limits for exemption, the Trustee‟s ability to pursue any value 
beyond the amount exempted was not contingent on 
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objecting. The District Court adopted this reasoning and 
affirmed. 
 
Orton contends on appeal that Schwab is a narrow case 
whose holding is confined to instances of debtor malfeasance 
or negligence in claiming exemptions. In Schwab, the debtor 
listed in Schedule B the value of her assets far below their 
actual fair market value, and then, in Schedule C, claimed that 
low-balled amount as exempt. The Court held that the 
debtor‟s exemption in Schedule C of the full, deflated amount 
listed in Schedule B failed to indicate an intent to exempt the 
entire asset. Orton contends that this holding was premised on 
two facts not present here: the actual value of the assets in 
Schwab turned out to be higher than both (a) the debtor‟s 
Schedule B estimates and (b) the statutory limits for 
exemption. Because the Schwab debtor undervalued an asset 
that, if correctly valued, would have exceeded the exemption 
limits, Orton argues the Schwab debtor never had a plausible 
chance of exempting the entire asset, making that case 
inapplicable to Orton‟s situation here. 
 
Here, Orton‟s valuation represents the actual, fair 
market value of the assets he seeks to exempt, and that value 
falls well within the statutory cap. Indeed, no party has 
intimated that Orton‟s estimated values do not represent the 
fair market value. Orton thus contends that Schwab‟s 
suggestion that debtors “list[] the exempt value as „full fair 
market value (FMV)‟ or „100% of FMV,‟” Schwab, 130 
S. Ct. at 2668, applies solely to circumstances in which a 
debtor cannot or will not accurately estimate, at the time of 
filing, what the fair market value of an asset might be. 
Because the full fair market value of Orton‟s oil and gas lease 
interest is one dollar and he exempted that full amount, Orton 
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contends that he gave sufficient notice to the Trustee of his 
desire to exempt the entire asset from the Estate, and not just 
one dollar‟s worth of its value.  
 
Trustee Rosemary Crawford responds that Schwab‟s 
clear holding states that merely exempting a dollar amount 
equal to the Schedule B estimated value is insufficient to 
manifest the intent to exempt an entire asset. This is so, the 
Trustee contends, irrespective of whether a debtor has 
accurately or inaccurately estimated an asset‟s fair market 
value. The Supreme Court wasted little ink discussing the 
debtor‟s inaccurate estimate and spent the bulk of its opinion 
explaining that, because § 522(d)(5) preserves merely an 
“interest” in an asset, a debtor seeking to exempt the entire 
asset must clearly put the trustee on notice of his intent to do 
so. To that end, the Supreme Court provided specific 
examples for debtors in Orton‟s exact situation to follow. 
Orton did not heed this advice: he did not “list[] the exempt 
value as „full fair market value (FMV),‟” nor did he note that 
the amount he exempted was meant to embody “„100% of 
FMV.‟” Schwab, 130 S. Ct. at 2668.  
 
In providing these illustrative examples, the Trustee 
asserts, the Schwab Court did not draw the fine distinctions 
Orton now proposes. The rationale in Schwab focused on 
concerns about placing trustees on notice, not concerns about 
inaccurate debtor valuations. Placing the onus squarely on the 
debtor, the Trustee contends, the Court established a 
presumption that a debtor‟s dollar-figure exemption under 
§ 522(d)(5) will entitle a debtor to the amount claimed, and 
no more, unless the debtor clearly gives notice that an entire 
asset is being exempted. As support, she notes that a debtor‟s 
Schedule B valuations are not binding, see Schwab, 130 
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S. Ct. at 2663, and thus cannot automatically exempt an asset 
from the estate simply by virtue of being equal to that asset‟s 
actual value at the time of filing.  
 
C. 
 
We agree with and will affirm the judgment of the 
Bankruptcy Court. The straightforward application of the 
teachings and instructions of Schwab here means that Orton 
properly exempted one dollar‟s worth of his oil and gas lease 
and no more. Little additional discussion is needed to buttress 
the Bankruptcy Court‟s and the District Court‟s persuasive 
conclusions.  
 
Notwithstanding Orton‟s artful attempts to distinguish 
his case, there is no indication in Schwab that the Court 
meant to carve out an exception that would benefit only 
debtors who are accurate (and lucky) enough to estimate and 
exempt an asset‟s exact fair market value. It is true that the 
Court explained, in a footnote, that they were not squarely 
addressing the “argument . . . that a claim to exempt the full 
value of the [asset] would, if unopposed, entitle [the debtor] 
to the [asset] itself as opposed to a payment equal to [its] full 
value.” Id. at 2668 n.21. And, “since it‟s a Supreme Court 
footnote, the parties haggle over its meaning . . . .” Flomo v. 
Firestone Nat‟l Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th 
Cir. 2011). But the Court went on to warn that such an 
argument was “at least questionable [because] Section 541 is 
clear that title to the [asset] passe[s] to [the debtor‟s] estate at 
the commencement of her case, and §§ 522(d)(5) and (6) are 
equally clear that her reclamation right is limited to 
exempting an interest in the [asset], not the [asset] itself.” Id.  
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At the very least, the Court was clear that exemptions 
under § 522(d)(5) are presumed to preserve a debtor‟s 
“interest” in an asset rather than the asset itself; a debtor 
seeking to retain more than an “interest” must indicate that 
fact unambiguously in the Schedules. See Schwab, 140 S. Ct. 
at 2668; cf. In re Gebhart, 621 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 
2010) (construing Schwab to hold that “the fact that the value 
of the claimed exemption . . . [was] equal to the market value 
of the [asset] at the time of filing the petition did not remove 
the entire asset from the estate”). The Court, moreover, did 
not leave to future debtors the chore of discerning how they 
might indicate this intent going forward. Rather, it 
enumerated the specific actions that would manifest an intent 
to exempt an entire asset. And even then, the Court warned, 
“it is far from obvious that the Code would „entitle‟ [a debtor] 
to clear title in [an asset] even if she claimed as exempt a 
„full‟ or „100%‟ interest in it (which she did not).” Id.  
 
Orton‟s case presents us with a question simpler than 
the one Schwab left open about a debtor claiming a “100%” 
exemption for an asset falling within the statutory limits. It is 
true that Orton‟s exemptions, unlike the Schwab debtor‟s, fell 
below § 522(d)(5)‟s dollar limit. But Orton did not claim a 
“full” or a “100%” interest in the lease, much less do 
anything else that might be construed as placing the Trustee 
on notice of his intent to exempt the entire lease. All Orton 
did was claim as exempt in Schedule C the same dollar 
amount that he estimated his lease to be worth in Schedule B. 
That is exactly what the debtor in Schwab did, too. That 
Orton‟s listed amount happened to constitute the lease‟s 
actual fair market value does not remove Orton‟s case from 
Schwab‟s ambit. Notwithstanding the existence of unused 
exemptions or the accuracy of a debtor‟s valuations, the 
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Schwab debtor failed to apprise the trustee that he sought to 
remove an asset from the estate, and so too did Orton.
1
 
 
Accordingly, Orton is entitled to a one-dollar interest 
in the oil and gas royalty lease, along with his $4,250 
                                              
1
 The few courts addressing the effect of claiming as exempt 
“100% of FMV” of an asset (or similar words) have held that 
using these phrases either renders the attempted exemption 
facially defective or invites an evidentiary hearing to 
determine the fair market value of the asset so that a dollar 
amount can be assigned to the exemption. They reason that 
“where the statutory basis for a debtor‟s claim of exemption 
provides only for an exemption of an interest in certain 
property up to a specific dollar amount, the „value of claimed 
exemption‟ must be identified as a monetary value.” In re 
Luckham, 464 B.R. 67, 77 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012); see also 
Massey v. Pappalardo, 465 B.R. 720 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2012); 
In re Stoney, 445 B.R. 543, 552 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2011); In re 
Moore, 442 B.R. 865, 868 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010). Thus, in 
claiming “100% of FMV,” based on present interpretations of 
Schwab, a debtor most likely cannot exempt an asset that is 
not exemptible in kind such that it is removed from the 
bankruptcy estate, and only is entitled to exempt the fair 
market value of the asset as of the date of the petition up to 
the dollar limit of the relevant exemption. Applied here, 
regardless of what language Orton used to list the value of the 
lease, he likely only is entitled to its fair market value as of 
the date of the filing of his petition—that is, one dollar. In 
short, though we do not rule on the effect of using “100% of 
FMV” or similar language, it is likely that there was no way 
for Orton to escape the outcome of our decision, irrespective 
of Schwab‟s “FMV” dicta. 
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exemption for real estate. Because this amount was within 
§ 522‟s exemptions limit, the Trustee need not have objected 
before later moving to except those assets from abandonment.  
 
V. 
 
Having resolved that Orton‟s dollar-amount 
exemptions gave him merely an interest in the oil and gas 
lease, the issue of whether any appreciation in value accrues 
to Orton or to the Estate is easily decided: when a debtor 
retains only an interest in an asset, rather than the asset itself, 
the debtor is limited to the value of the exemption; the estate 
is entitled to any appreciation in the asset‟s value beyond the 
amount exempted. See In re Paolella, 85 B.R. 974, 976 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); cf. In re Reed, 949 F.2d 1317, 1324 
(9th Cir. 1991) (holding that an asset‟s appreciation in value 
goes to the estate, not the debtor); In re Potter, 228 B.R. 422, 
424 (B.A.P. 8th Cir 1999) (same). The Bankruptcy Court 
relied on well-settled precedents to reach this conclusion, and 
we see no reason to disturb its well-reasoned judgment.  
 
Orton marshals several persuasive, logical arguments 
to support his theory that a debtor should be entitled to an 
asset‟s post-petition appreciation in value. But those 
arguments apply only if the debtor actually exempts the asset 
as a whole. As discussed above, Orton has retained merely an 
interest in his oil and gas lease, worth one dollar, and no 
more. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in fact, 
applied Schwab to a claim similar to Orton‟s and held that, 
even where “debtors accurately value[] [an asset] at the time 
of bankruptcy filing, but the fair market value[] of the [asset] 
increase[s] subsequent to filing[,] [t]his distinction . . . does 
not alter the analysis. Under [Schwab], an exemption claimed 
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under a dollar-value exemption statute is limited to the value 
claimed at filing.” In re Gebhart, 621 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th 
Cir. 2010). Because allowing a debtor to retain value beyond 
what was declared on Schedule C would “convert a fresh start 
to a free pass,” Schwab at 130 S. Ct. at 2667, a trustee need 
not object to a debtor‟s exemptions to preserve an estate‟s 
rights to value beyond the amount exempted, id. at 2661-2663 
& n.10. Hence, the asset itself and any amount beyond what 
Orton exempted are now property of the Estate.  
 
Orton attempts to sidestep this no-nonsense conclusion 
by contending that, even if the estate is entitled to an asset‟s 
value at the time of filing, the debtor may collect any 
appreciation in value of the asset that postdates the 
bankruptcy. But an estate‟s entitlement is not set in stone at 
the time of filing, much less at any other time. To the 
contrary, the quintessential purpose of limiting a debtor to a 
dollar-amount exemption is to permit the trustee to liquidate 
assets in the best interest of the creditors by cashing out the 
debtor, effectively removing him from considerations about 
how to administer the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1) 
(“[The Trustee must] collect and reduce to money the 
property of the estate for which such trustee serves, and close 
such estate as expeditiously as is compatible with the best 
interest of the parties . . . .”); Kuehner v. Irving Trust, 299 
U.S. 445, 452 (1937). To that end, § 541(a)(6) establishes that 
any “[p]roceeds, products, offspring, rents or profits of or 
from property of the estate”—in other words, appreciation of 
value—become the property of the estate as well.  
 
Orton retains an interest in his lease; the lease itself is 
property of the Estate. Accordingly, as a “product[] . . . or 
15 
 
profit[]” of the Estate‟s property, any potential appreciation in 
its value is properly retained by the Estate.  
 
VI. 
 
In light of Schwab, Orton‟s Schedule C dollar-amount 
exemptions failed to adequately give notice to the Trustee of 
Orton‟s intent to fully exempt his interests in the oil and gas 
lease. The Trustee, therefore, need not have objected to 
Orton‟s exemptions to retain the ability to except the lease 
from abandonment. Because Orton did not fully exempt his 
interest in the lease, moreover, he has no claim to any future 
appreciation in its value. We will, therefore, affirm the 
decisions of the District Court and Bankruptcy Court. 
 
